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Abstract
Banks can fail because of bad economic fundamentals, and/or general panic
withdrawals by depositors who feel the bank does not have su¢ cient reserves
to meet the demand. This paper attempts to nd the optimal reserve level and
early returns the banks should decide on.
If the reserve policy of the bank is transparent, it is found that more reserves
have to be put aside over and above the real need, and this ine¢ ciency increases
with the proportion of impatient agents. It is also found that the optimal early
return is lower than the rst-best. The model recommends that when reserve
policy is transparent there is no need for regulation.
However, if reserve policy is not transparent, the model recommends regu-
lation for both reserves and early returns. This is because of the moral hazard
problem, the banks would keep lower reserves and o¤er higher early returns than
what maximises depositor welfare.
JEL Classications: D82, G21,G28
Key Words: Optimal reserves, short term interest rate, Bank runs, global
game, Unique equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Banks collect money from individuals as deposits, and invest in long-term projects
while keeping part of the deposits as reserves. Because banks are trying to nance
long-term projects with short-term liabilities, they become vulnerable to bank runs.
USA went through this experience during 1890-1908 and 1929-1933 when there were
21 and 5 bank-panics respectively. Lindgren, Garcia and Saal(1996) state that 73% of
the IMFs member countries su¤ered some form of banking crisis between 1980-1996.
More recently in the 21st century we have the crisis in Argentina and Uruguay.
Banking crises can happen because of ine¢ cient management, bad economic con-
ditions or fraud. In addition to that, banks can also fail because of general panic that
prompt the depositors to withdraw too much, forcing the banks to shutdown. There
is empirical evidence for both these causes.1
Various models have been put forward trying to explain bank runs. The Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) model, which is considered a pioneering paper in bank runs, shows
that bank runs are caused by self-fullling beliefs of depositors. Their model has two
equilibria: the bank-run equilibrium and the no bank-run equilibrium.
Following the Diamond and Dybvigs sun-spot explanation given to bank runs,
there were many models that showed that bank runs were actually information-based
- i.e. they said that depositorsdecision to withdraw was because of the information
they receive about expected returns:2 Theoretically and empirically it has been shown
that bank runs are caused by both self-fullling beliefs and information about returns.
The existence of multiple equilibria in the Diamond and Dybvig model made it
di¢ cult for useful analysis and comparison of policies. However a signicant break
through in this strand of literature has now been made. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)
establish a unique equilibrium in a model based on global games introduced by Carlson
and Van Damme (1993) and extended by Morris and Shin (1998). Everything that
1Demirgue - Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Gorton (1988) have
done studies on adverse banking conditions triggering o¤ banking crises. Radlet and Sachs (1998),
having examined the characteristics of nancial crises in Mexico-1994/5, Argentina-1995 and East
Asia-1997, note that one of the reasons was the element of self-fullling crisis.
2Gorton 1985 (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Alonso (1996), Loewy (1998), Cooper and
Ross (1998), Bougheas (1999) are some of the main ones. Chari and Jegannathan (1988) developed
a model where the rational expectation equilibrium is a combination of fundamental bank-runs and
speculative bank runs.
2
has an inuence on the uncertain return of the long term project is captured by the
economic fundamental. If agents receive noisy signals about the economic fundamental
(as opposed to the common knowledge of the fundamental in the Diamond and Dybvig
model), a threshold fundamental exists, below which there would be a bank-run and
above which there will not be a bank-run. Bank runs continue to be driven by bad
expectations that others would withdraw, but the belief itself is uniquely determined
by the threshold value. They use this unique equilibrium to compute the probability
of bank runs and show that it increases with the proportion of impatient agents and
return given to early withdrawers.
Modelling bank runs using noisy signals allows for withdrawals to be based both
on information and self-fullling beliefs. It further gives a unique equilibrium which
enables us to arrive at important policy decisions. The model is closest to the Goldstein
and Pauzner (2005) set up. The crucial di¤erence is in the question it addresses. Using
the unique equilibrium this paper attempts to throw some light on two important
decisions that a bank has to make: reserves it has to keep and short term interest it
has to o¤er early withdrawers.
A bank can fail because of insolvency or illiquidity. The outcome of the economic
fundamental cannot be controlled by that bank. But the bank should try to avoid
failure due to illiquidity by keeping adequate reserves. Even though the depositors
are concerned about the banks protability, if they feel that the bank does not have
enough liquidity, there will be a panic-run. Higher the early return, higher the incentive
for people to withdraw early. The more early withdrawals that is anticipated, the more
should be the reserves to meet the demand. Keeping reserves reduces the earning
capacity of the bank but increases the availability of money to meet the demand for
early withdrawals. Therefore it is important that a right balance is kept between
earning in the long-term and having su¢ cient liquidity to meet the demand in the
short-term.
Here, the banks face the possibility of depositors withdrawing because of genuine
liquidity shocks as well as self-fullling beliefs. A xed proportion of depositors have
to withdraw early because they are hit by a liquidity shock. These depositors receive
a liquidity shock and have to denitely withdraw early. In addition to that, the
depositors also observe a noisy signal about the banks future earning potential. If
they expect to lose out by waiting, even those who are not hit by the liquidity shock
will withdraw early. The bank is a prot maximiser, but operating in a competitive
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environment.
We look at this problem under two scenarios: scenario 1 is when the level of
reserves that the bank keeps can be observed by the depositors and scenario 2 is when
the reserve policy of the bank is not transparent. The key di¤erence in the outcomes of
the two scenarios is that we nd that when reserves is transparent there is no need for
regulation whereas when it is not transparent there is a need for regulation, both for
reserves and early returns. There is also support for regulation in other papers where
it is predicted that banks would not keep su¢ cient reserves if it is not observable.3
1.1 Main Results
When the reserve policy is transparent (scenario 1), because the bank is operating
in a competitive environment, the bank seeks to maximise the expected utility of the
depositors because it operates in a competitive market. The model predicts that the
bank can nd an optimal reserve level and an early return rate to maximise expected
utility of depositors.
First we look at the rst-best scenario where the bank can observe whether the
depositors are patient or impatient and therefore would only meet the demand of
those who are impatient. The rst-best reserve level would be just enough to meet the
demand of the impatient agents.
In the next section, the bank cannot distinguish between the patient and impatient
depositors. It is found that the optimal level of reserves and the early return that the
bank chooses, increase with the proportion of impatient agents and reduce with the
long term earning potential. These results are quite intuitive. When the agents face
a higher probability of being hit by a liquidity shock, they will wwant a higher early
return to maximise their expected utility. In order to that, the reserve level should be
higher and also, the agents will need more reassurance of su¢ cient reserves.
An interesting result is that the early return that maximises expected utility is
always below one as long as some agents are impatient. This means that even if agents
withdraw because they are genuinely hit by a liquidity shock, they are penalised and
given less than what they invested! Comparing the results with the rst-best scenario
3Cothren (1987), Bhattacharya and Boot (1998). According to Clouse and Dow (2002), banks
adjust their reserves to keep the probability of failure due to liquidity constant. Ringborn et al (2004)
show that the optimal reserves reduces with the earning potential of the investment and increases with
the depositorsexpected need to withdraw and the correlation of liquidity shocks among depositors.
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the early return in the rst-best scenario is higher. This is because in the rst-best
case, the bank keeps reserves only to serve the impatient depositors and does not have
to use early return as an instrument to dissuade patient agents from withdrawing early.
Even though a higher early return provides more insurance against liquidity shocks,
it increases the risk of bank runs by providing an incentive for early withdrawal and
reducing the long-term earning potential of the bank. This paper shows that it is
optimal to actually penalise those who withdraw early even if they are genuinely
hit by a liquidity shock. This result endorses the results obtained by Goldstein and
Pauzner as well.
An important result of this paper is that the optimal choice of reserves and early
return gives a threshold such that, in the existence of impatient agents, some patient
agents would also want to withdraw early. The bank keeps reserves over and above
what is needed to meet the demand of those who are genuinely hit by the liquidity
shock. This ine¢ ciency of keeping reserves to serve patient agents increases with the
proportion of impatient agents.
The model predicts that the probability of bank runs increases with early returns,
but reduces with reserves. If early return is high, agents get higher return when they
withraw early and there is more probability that the bank would crash because of
insu¢ cient reserves. On the other hand, when reserves are high, the agents have the
condence that the bank will have su¢ cient reserves to survive till the next period. The
model also points out that when the expected utility of the depositors is maximised, the
bank would choose reserves and early returns where there will be a positive probability
of bank runs.
Policy makers should take note of these ndings. If depositors can observe the
reserves and there is competition in the market, the banks would choose reserves
and early returns to maximise the depositorsexpected utility. Therefore this model
suggests there is no need for regulation.
The analysis under scenario 2 when the reserve policy of the bank is not transparent
however, recommends that there is indeed a role for regulation. The results in scenario
1 was driven by the fact that the reserves kept by the bank was public knowledge. It is
a reasonable assumption that the depositors will not have this information when they
make decisions.
The results predict that the bank would then keep reserves just su¢ cient to meet
the demand of those hit by the liquidity shock. The level of reserves is lower if it
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cannot be observed than what would be put aside if it cannot be observed. Also, if
reserves cannot be observed, the chosen level of reserves makes the expected utility
lower and the probability of bank runs higher.
Another interesting result is also obtained when the banks reserve policy cannot
be observed. If we allow the banks to choose the early return that is o¤ered to those
withdrawing early, the bank would choose it to be ine¢ ciently high to attract customers
in the competitive market. Early return is higher when reserves cannot be observed
than what would be chosen if the level of reserves was transparent. This is also
detrimental for the nancial stability of the country, because the chosen early return
pushes up the probability of bank runs.
Therefore the regulators have important roles to play when level of reserves cannot
be observed. The level of reserves as well as the early return should be regulated. They
should keep a tab on the upper bound of the early return that a bank can o¤er and
the minimum level of reserves that is put aside to meet early withdrawal.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: First we look at scenario 1 where
the level of reserves is transparent. Here the model is set up in section 2, followed by
section 3 where the unique equilibrium is established. Section 4 looks at the rst-best
scenario and at the case where the bank cannot distinguish between the two types.
Then we look at scenario 2 where the level of reserves is not transparent. The model
is set up in section 5, followed by a discussion about the unique equilibrium. Section
7 discusses the level of reserves that is chosen, comparing when the reserves can be
observed and when it is private information. Section 8 analyses what happens if early
returns can also be chosen by the bank. Section 9 concludes.
Scenario I - Transparent Reserve Policy
2 The Model
The model has three periods ( t0; t1; t2). There is a continuum [0,1] of agents who are
the depositors, and a bank which operates in a competitive market. All the agents
have endowments of one unit at the beginning of t0. Consumption happens only in
periods t1 and t2. Agents can be of two types - either patient or impatient. They
learn their types at the beginning of t1 which is their private information. Impatient
agents can derive utility only by consuming in t1 and patient agents can derive utility
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from consuming in either t1 or t2. All agents are identical and risk averse, and each
agents utility function is increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly concave
and has a relative risk aversion coe¢ cient of 0 <  cu"(c)
u0(c) < 1. More specically, their
utility functions are given by u = c1 for the impatient agents and u = (c1 + c2)
 for
the patient agents where  2 (0; 1) and ct is the return the agent gets in period t.
Expected returns from investing in a bank are high enough such that the agents
will invest their endowments of one unit in the bank at date t0. The bank keeps
proportion  as reserves, and invests the balance (1  ) in a long term risky project.
Those agents who withdraw early in t1 will receive a return of r (early return) that
is chosen by the bank. If the demand for withdrawals in t1 exceeds the reserves ,
the bank has to liquidate the long term project at a very small value (close to zero)
and therefore will have to close down in t1 unless the bank is in the upper dominant
region, which is explained later). If the bank crashes in t1 those who waited without
withdrawing early will receive nothing.
Each unit that is invested in the long term project in t0 realizes  at date t2. The
fundamental  captures everything that will a¤ect the return of the investment such
as the economic and political environment that inuence the success of the project
etc. In t2 everything that is available is distributed equally among all those depositors
who did not withdraw early. The bank operates in a competitive environment and
therefore its objective is to maximise the expected utility of the depositors subject to
zero prots. If not, the bank will lose all the customers to banks that o¤er a slightly
better deal.
The economic fundamental  is uncertain and is drawn from a uniform distribution
on

; 

where = 0 and  > 0 and large. At the beginning of t1  is realised and
each agent i observes a noisy signal i =  + i of the economic fundamental . The
noise i is uniformly and independently distributed among the depositors with support
[ e;+e] : Once the agents observe the signal, they will decide whether to withdraw in
t1 or wait till t2. This decision is based on their beliefs about  that is realised and the
number of agents who would withdraw in t1. The signal received by each agent can be
interpreted as the information about the return in t2 that is privately available to them
and their ability to interpret them. Higher the i higher is agent is own expectation
of the return on the investment. In addition to that, when an agent receives a high
signal he also expects the other agents to have received a higher signal and therefore
is less likely to withdraw.
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At the beginning of t1; proportion  of the depositors receive a liquidity shock which
would require them to withdraw early, irrespective of . This can also be understood
as each agent having  probability of being hit by a liquidity shock. There is no
aggregate uncertainty (i.e.  is xed and known), but the bank cannot distinguish the
type of each agent individually. The bank keeps a reserve  to meet early demand in
t1. The reserves has to be at least r to meet the demand of the impatient agents who
will denitely withdraw. If  turns out to be more than that, it shows ine¢ ciency.
To analyse the ine¢ ciency we can say that  = r + (1  ), where  indicates the
extent of ine¢ ciency in having to keep more reserves over and above what is needed
to serve the genuinely impatient agents.
Because the bank operates in a competitive environment, it will choose r and  to
maximise the expected utility of the depositors subject to zero prot.
3 Unique Equilibrium
First we have to establish that a unique equilibrium  exists, below which everyone
will withdraw and above which no one will withdraw. In keeping with the literature,
one of the conditions that is needed to get this unique equilibrium is that  should
have an upper dominant region and a lower dominant region. Explaining this further,
it should be feasible to get an extremely good signal where the return is so high that
no patient agent would want to withdraw early regardless of the behaviour of the other
agents. These signals are said to belong to the upper dominant region. There also
exists a lower dominant region where you receive an extremely bad signal and the
returns are so low that the agent would denitely withdraw even if no other patient
agent withdraws. A very small probability of an occurrence of these dominant regions
is su¢ cient (never the less it is needed) to drive a unique equilibrium  so that the
patient agent i would not withdraw in t1 if and only if i > 
 and would withdraw
regardless of his type if i < 
.
When only impatient agents withdraw, if an agent does not withdraw he will get a
payo¤of (1 )+ r
1  : This value has to be less than or equal to r for it to be worthwhile
withdrawing.. If the realisation of  was such that when only the impatient  agents
withdraw, the return he gets is (1 )+(1 )
1   r it is better to withdraw early even
if no other patient agent withdraws. For this to be true, the fundamental should be
lower than 
s


s
= (1 )(r )
1 

. The lower dominant region is [; 
s
) where everyone will
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withdraw. The di¤erence between an agents signal and the true value of  will not be
more than e and therefore if player is signal is i < 
s
  e he will denitely withdraw
because he knows that  < 
s
.
Likewise the upper dominant region is (e; ] where  is so high that even if everyone
else withdraws it is better for the patient agent not to withdraw. We assume that when
 is very high, the bank is able to obtain loans against their investments at a very high
interest rate : The bank will have to settle the loan before distributing the prot to
the depositors who waited. If everyone else withdraws the bank will need a loan of
(r   ). The bank will be able to get this loan if (1  )   (r   ) (1 + )  0. When
 is high enough so that the bank can secure this loan, if the agent withdraws early,
he will receive r. If he does not withdraw he will receive (1  )   (r   ) (1 + ).
If (1  )   (r   ) (1 + )  r the agent is better o¤ by not withdrawring even if
everyone else withdraws. This gives e = r+(r )(1+)
(1 ) . The agents are aware of this. If
the signal that a patient player i receives is i > e + e he will denitely not withdraw
because he knows that  > e.
If an agent receives a signal close to a dominant region, there is a probability
that there would be some who have received signals within that dominant region
and therefore have a dominant strategy. This will ensure that this player also to
follow that strategy. This process can be iterated so that we eventually arrive at the
unique threshold point where the agent will be indi¤erent between withdrawing or not
withdrawing.
A threshold  can be computed for cases where  = 0 and  > 0. When computing
 we only consider the range [   e;  + e] and assume that the dominant regions
are extreme enough that they will not have an inuence over .
3.1 Threshold 
Once  is realised player i observes a signal i =  + "i. The strategy in t1 for an
impatient agent (who is hit by the liquidity shock) is to withdraw irrespective of his
signal. The strategy for the patient player is given as the map:
si :
h

s
  e;e + ei! fwithdraw, not withdrawg :
We consider threshold strategies and set out the conditions for  to be a symmetric
equilibrium.
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The threshold strategy for each player would be
si = withdraw if i < 

i :
= not withdraw if i > 

i :
Symmetric threshold strategy would mean i = 
; for every player i.
If a patient agent i observes a signal i > 
, he will not withdraw. This is because
he would then believe that the return on the project is going to be high enough and
su¢ cient number of other depositors will also decide the same. If he observes i < 
,
he will withdraw because he believes that su¢ ciently high enough number of the other
agents would have received a signal which would prompt them to withdraw, so that if
he waited till the next period he would get nothing.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium  such that if agents received a
signal below that they would withdraw in t1 and if they received a signal above that they
would not withdraw in t1 unless they are hit by the liquidity shock.
The following discussion leads to the proof of proposition 1: For now, let patient
agents withdraw if they receive a signal less than b. Agent i has received a signal
i. Player is posterior distribution of the  that is realised, which we call y (= =i) is
uniform on [i   e; i + e]. 4
f(y) = 1
2e
if y 2 [i   e; i + e] :
= 0 if y =2 [i   e; i + e] :
This is true for all except those points very close to the ends. (This would not be
true for  < 
s
+ e and  > e   e .)
For each point y 2 [i   e; i + e], he will believe that all the other agents would
have received independent and uniformly distributed signals [y   e; y + e] and hence
the proportion of patient agents whom he believes would withdraw (i.e. those who
received a signal less than b) is a distribution e! (y) 2 [0; 1] given by:
e! =
8>>><>>>:
0 if y > b + e
1 if y < b   eb y+e
2e
if b   e  y  b + e
9>>>=>>>; :
4Let b 2 [i   e; i + e]
Pr

 = b=i = 1   12eR i+e
i e
1
   12ed0
= 12e
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At each point of y his belief about the proportion who withdraw would be
+ e! (y)  (1  ) :
When the depositors receive private signals about  in t1, they will withdraw if
their signal was a value less than b: But if any player observes a value more than b
he will withdraw only if he was impatient. Proportion  of the agents would turn out
to be impatient and withdraw early because of the liquidity shock irrespective of :
Proportion e! out of the (1  ) patient agents would be believed to withdraw because
of the bad signal they received.
The bank keeps a reserve  (= r +  (1  )) : The amount r is to cater for the
demand by the impatient agents who will denitely withdraw. In addition to that,
 (1  ) is kept as reserves for the patient agents who might want to withdraw early
in t1: Therefore it is rational that  2 (r; r) : Note that this is over and above the
reserves in the rst-best case. If demand for withdrawals exceed the liquidity available,
the bank would crash because the assets are liquidated for a very small amount.
Let player i receive signal i. Expected returns to the agent i who receives signal
i if he runs is as follows:
1) If r+(1  ) e!r < , y > b+e  2e
r
: he believes there is su¢ cient reserves to
meet the demand and therefore will receive r for sure, giving him an expected utility
of, Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy:
2) If r + (1  ) e!r >  , y < b + e   2e
r
: he believes there isnt su¢ cient
reserves to meet the demand. Therefore he receives r with probability 
r+(1 )e!r
giving an expected utility of,
Z b+e  2e
r
i e
1
2e
 
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy:
On the other hand, if the agent i does not run, he believes that he will not get
anything if r + (1  ) e!r >  because the bank would have crashed in t1 itself.
However, if r+ (1  ) e!r < , he will expect to receive  r (1 )!(y)r+(1 )y
(1 )(1 e!(y)) in t2:
This gives him an expected utility of:
11
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u

  r   (1  )  e! (y)  r + (1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e! (y))

dy:
The returns that agent i (who is patient) would get can be summarised as follows:
r + (1  ) e!r   r + (1  ) e!r > 
Withdraw early r r with probability 
r+(1 )e!r
Not withdraw early  r (1 )e!r+(1 )y
(1 )(1 e!) 0
The di¤erence in the expected utility of agent i who received signal i between
withdrawing and not withdrawing is given by:
g

i;b = EU(withdraw=i)  EU(not withdraw=i)
g (i (r; ; )) =
Z b+e  2e
r
i e
1
2e
 
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy +
+
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy + (1)
 
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u

  r   (1  )  e! (y)  r + (1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e! (y))

dy:
The proof that there exists a unique point i = 
 such that g ( (r; ; )) = 0
where player i is indi¤erent between withdrawing and not, is found in appendix 1.
Since all agents are identical, all patient players would withdraw if the received a
signal below ; and will not withdraw if they received a signal :
3.2 Comparative Statics on 
Having higher r provides incentive for the agents to withdraw early. So, if we want to
minimise the probability of bank runs (i.e. minimise ), we should penalise all those
who withdraw early including those who are genuinely hit by the liquidity shock.
Furthermore, depositors realise that more the early return, r, more the probability
that the reserves might not be su¢ cient to meet early demand.
On the other hand when  increases, the agents will have more condence that the
bank will survive till t2 and will be willing to wait. Therefore 
 will go down with .
It is also intuitive that the threshold  increases with the proportion of impatient
investors, . Higher the probability of liquidity shock, higher the probability that
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patient investors will also withdraw early. This is because higher reserves need to be
kept, reducing the long-term return. When the probability of getting hit by a liquidity
shock is higher, the depositors want higher insurance in the form of a higher r. All
these factors encourage the patient agents also to withdraw early. These results are
summarised in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The threshold  increases with r and , but decreases with :
Proof. Using equation 1 that gives the di¤erence in expected utility when running
and not running so that the indi¤erent condition for the agent to withdraw early or
wait is when g ( (r; ; )) = 0.
g ( (r; ; )) =
Z +e  2e
r
 e
1
2e
  (; r; )
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy +
Z +e
+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy
 
Z +e
+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u

(1  ) (   e! (y)) r + (1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e! (y))

dy: (2)
As  increases, more people withdraw early. For given reserves,  and early return,
r the expected return by withdrawing early is therefore less. This means the rst two
terms go down with . The expected return by withdrawing late increases.
@g
@
=
1
2e
0@   (1 )r u (r)  u (r) (1  ) R +e  2er e dy(r+(1 )e!r)2
  R +e
+e  2e
r

u0(:)
2e(1 )(1 e!)2 ((1  ) y   (1  ) (1  ) r)

dy
1A < 0: (3)
Consider what happens to g when r is increased. If you withdraw early, you are
better o¤ if r is high. The rst two terms in equation (2) increase with r. The return
to those who do not withdraw, given by the third term however, goes down with r.
Therefore @g
@r
> 0. By the implicit function theorem d

dr
> 0. So,  increases with r.
Q.E.D.
What happens to  when  changes? The second term in g is not a¤ected by .
In the rst term, because 
r
< e! < 1, an increase in  will reduce the denominator
more than the numerator. Hence, the whole term will go up with : This is because,
when there are more impatient agents, it pays to withdraw early. The last term relates
to the returns you get by not withdrawing. More the , less the return for those who
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wait. Therefore @g
@
> 0. We know that @g
@ < 0. Therefore
d
d
> 0: So,  increases
with .
Q.E.D.
Finally we look at what happens to  when  changes.
@g
@
=  1
r
u
 
(1  )   + e  2e
r

(1  )  1  
r
 ! (4)
+
Z +e  2e
r
 e
1
2e
(1  )u (r)
r + (1  ) e! (y) rdy
 
Z +e
+e  2e
r
1
2e
u

1  y
1  e!

dy:
@g
@

=0
=  1
r
u

(1  r) (j=0 + e)
(1  )

  u (r)
r
log () < 0: (5)
Note that
g ()j!0 =
Z +e
 e
1
2e
 r
r + (1  ) +y e
2e
r
u (r) dy; (6)
Therefore j=0 is very large, close to the upper dominant region. So we can say
that @g
@

=0
< 0.
@g
@

!r
!  1 < 0:
d2g
d2
=  1
r
0@ u0(:)(1 )( e)r(1 r )2 +
+ (1 )u(r)
r+(1 ) + u

1  e+ 2e
r
1 
r

1A < 0: (7)
Therefore we can conclude that @g
@
< 0. We know that @g
@ < 0, which means
d
d
< 0. So,  deccreases with .
4 Maximising Expected Utility
4.1 First Best
As the benchmark, we look at the rst-best scenario where the bank not only knows
that  proportion of the depositors will be a¤ected by liquidity shocks, but also knows
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exactly who is impatient and who is patient. Therefore, the bank will be able to o¤er
a contract which promises return r in t1 only to those  proportion of agents who
are impatient. Patient agents will not be served in t1: The bank will therefore keep
reserves  = r which is just su¢ cient to meet the demand from the impatient agents.
The patient agents will have to wait till t2 and receive
(1 )
1 

= (1 r)
1 

:
In this case, there will be no bank run because the patient agents will not receive
anything early. The threshold  turns out to be equal to . Therefore the expected
utility of an agent is:
EUFB = u (r) + (1  )
Z 

1
   u

(1  r) 
(1  )

d: (8)
The rst-order condition for optimal early return rFB;
dEUFB
dr
= u0 (r) +
(1  )
   
Z 

u0

(1  r) 
1  
  
1  

d = 0: (9)
d2EUFB
dr2
= u00 (r) +
2
(1  )     
Z 


u00

(1  r) 
(1  )

2d

: (10)
Since u00 (:) < 0, d
2EUFB
dr2
< 0
We use the benchmark result to compare with the results when the bank cannot
distinguish between the two types. In bank run models agents can also withdraw
early because of self fullling beliefs, and therefore banks face the risk of unnecessary
failure. What is important in this exercise is to nd the optimal level of reserves and
early return rates that will maximise the expected utility of the investors, taking into
consideration the possibility of too much early withdrawal and bankruptcy.
4.2 Expected Utility
The bank operates in a competitive environment and therefore wants to maximise the
expected utility of the agent subject to zero prot. When  <  <   e there is total
run because everyone would receive a signal that is below the threshold value. When
+ e <  <  no one will withdraw early because all the players would receive signals
that are above . But when  e <  < +e we have a partial run. The probability
of partial run is close to zero because noise is very small and can be ignored.
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Therefore, if  <  everybody will withdraw early, whose demand has to be met
with the available reserves . On the other hand, if  > , only those who are
impatient will withdraw early. In which case, the player has  probability of being
impatient and receives r; and he has (1  ) probability of being patient and receives
 r+(1 )
1 

.
Therefore the expected utility of each agent at the beginning of t0 can be written
as follows:
EU =
Z 

1
   

r
u (r) d + (11)
+
Z 

1
   

u (r) + (1  )u

  r + (1  ) 
1  

d:
The optimal reserve level and early return will be decided by maximising EU given
by equation (11).
4.3 Reserves
Recall that the reserves is given by  = r +  (1  ). The amount  (1  ) is put
aside to cater to the demand of patient agents who might withdraw early because of
self fullling beliefs. If  > 0, the optimal level of reserves  > r. This means the
bank is keeping as reserves more than what is needed to meet the demand of those who
are genuinely hit by the liquidity shock. Keeping excess reserves reduces the amount
that can be invested in protable projects. Higher the , higher this ine¢ ciency.
Proposition 3 When  > 0,  > 0 which shows there is ine¢ ciency in the optimal
level of reserves.
Proof. The rst-order condition to choose optimal  is @EU
@
= 0:
@EU
@
=
1
    
0BB@
r+(1 )
r
u (r) d

d
+
R 

(1 )
r
u (r) d+
 
h
u (r) + (1  )u

(1 )+(1 r (1 ))
1 
i
d
d
+
+
R 

h
(1  )u0

(1 )+(1 r (1 ))
1 

(1  )
i
d
1CCA = 0: (12)
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When  = 0;
@EU
@

=0
=
1  
    
0@  u (1 r) j=01    dd =0 + u(r) j=0r +
+
R 
j=0 u
0

(1 r)
1 

(1  ) d
1A : (13)
Since @

@

=0
< 0 and j=0 is large, it is obvious that @EU@

=0
> 0. This shows that
the optimal reserve is such that  > 0.
The next proposition says that the ine¢ ciency of keeping excess reserves, captured
by , increases with the proportion of impatient agents  and reduces with the earning
capacity of the bank . The ine¢ ciency of keeping excess reserves is caused by the
existence of impatient agents. Higher the , more the reserves that should be put
aside. This not only reduces the opportunity of cost of withdrawing early to the
patient agents but also increases their risk if they do not withdraw early. Therefore
higher the  higher the probability that patient agents will panic and withdraw early
and hence higher reserves should be put aside to meet their early demand.
Though the ine¢ ciency of excess reserves increases with , it decreases with the
earning capacity of the long term project. To capture the earning capacity, we look
at what happens when  increases. It is quite intuitive that when the expected return
from waiting is more, those who are patient are less tempted to withdraw early and
therefore reduce the need for excess reserves.
Proposition 4 The ine¢ ciency in reserves given by  increases with  and decreases
with :
Proof. We use the rst-order condition for  given by equation (12). Let
h
 

 
; 

= @EU
@
:
h
 

 
; 

=
r + (1  )
r
u (r)
d
d
+
Z 

(1  )
r
u (r) d (14)
 

u (r) + (1  )u

(1  ) + (1  r    (1  )) 
1  

d
d
+
Z 


(1  )u0

(1  ) + (1  r    (1  )) 
1  

(1  )

d:
Because h = @EU
@
and we are maximising EU , @h
@ < 0. Moreover, we know that
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EU goes down with : @EU
@
< 0. The reduction in EU when  increases, also increases
when  increases. This means, @h
@
> 0 and therefore d

d
> 0: So,  increases with .
Q.E.D.
We know that @h
@ < 0: Moreover, we know that EU increases with :
@EU
@
> 0.
Therefore the reduction in EU when  increases, decreases when  also increases.
Therefore @h
@
< 0 which means, d

d
< 0. So,  deccreases with .
4.4 Early Return
Next we look at some results about the optimal early return r: Higher the probability
that agents could be impatient, the more they would like to receive as early return.
Further more, when  is high, the patient depositors would like to withdraw early
because they know that more people will be withdrawing early, depleting the reserves.
Both these reasons combined result in the r increasing with . On the other hand,
when  is higher, the expected utility of waiting is higher, which pushes down the
required r.
Proposition 5 The optimal level of early returns r increases with  and decreases
with :
Proof. We use the rst-order condition for choosing optimal r, '
 
r
 
; 

=
@EU
@r
= 0;
'
 
r
 
; 

=
r + (1  )
r
u (r)
d
dr
+
Z 

u0 (r) +
(1  )
r2
(ru0 (r)  u (r)) d (15)
 

u (r) + (1  )u

(1  ) + (1  r    (1  )) 
1  

d
dr
+
Z 

 
u0 (r)+
(1  )u0

(1 )+(1 r (1 ))
1 
   
1 
 ! d:
Because u (r) is concave, the rst term in the EU function (i.e. the expected utility
when the depositor will have to withdraw because his signal is below the threshold
level) is also concave. In the second part, u (r) as well as (1  )u

(1 )+(1 r (1 ))
1 

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are concave. Thereby, the whole expression of EU is concave and therefore @
2EU
@r2
< 0.
This means @'
@r < 0:
Moreover, we know that EU goes down with : @EU
@
< 0. The reduction in EU
when r increases, also increases when  increases. This means, @'
@
> 0 and therefore
dr
d
> 0:
So, r increases with .
Q.E.D
Next we see how r behaves with :
@'
@
= u0 (r) + (1  )u0

(1  ) + (1  r    (1  )) 
1  
  
1  

: (16)
Because  is large, @'
@
< 0. Moreover, we know that EU increases with : @EU
@
> 0.
Therefore the reduction in EU when r increases, decreases when  also increases which
means @'
@
< 0. We already know that @'
@r < 0: Therefore,
dr
d
< 0: So, r deccreases
with .
Proposition 6 below gives an interesting result.
Proposition 6 When there are impatient agents, the optimal level of early returns
0 < r < 1:
Proof. Recall the rst order condition for choosing optimal r given by equation
(15),
@EU
@r

r=0
= (1  )
0@ r2  + u + (1 (1 ))1   ddr +
  R 


u0

(1 )+(1 (1 ))
1 
  

1 

d
1A :
Since the rst term goes to +1, @EU
@r

r=0
> 0:
@EU
@r

r=1
=
1
    
0BBBBB@
+ (1  ) d
dr
+
R 

+ (1  ) (  1) d+
 

+ (1  )u

(1 )+(1  (1 ))
1 

d
dr
+
+
R 
 + (1  )u0

(1 )+(1  (1 ))
1 
   
1 

d
1CCCCCA :
(17)
We can re-write the above as follows:
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@EU
@r

r=1
=
1
    
0BB@
  (1  ) (1  ) 
  (1  ) [u ( + (1  ) )  ] d
dr
  R 
 u
0

(1 )+(1  (1 ))
1 

d + 
1CCA : (18)
It is obvious that @EU
@r

r=1
< 0. We know that @
2EU
@r2
< 0 and r > 0. Therefore we
can conclude that 0 < r < 1.
When there is a probability of being hit by a liquidity shock, high early return,
r gives an insurance to the depositors. However, if a high r is o¤ered, it will be an
incentive for those who are not hit by the liquidity shock also to withdraw early. This
is shown in proposition 2. In order to discourage them from doing so, even those who
are genuinely hit by the liquidity shock have to be penalised. This means that the
optimal choice of r does not give much in terms of insurance against the liquidity
shock. In fact, to maximise expected returns, early return should be less than the
investment. Institutional restraints compelling banks to give early returns r  1 is a
way of ensuring better insurance. However, this has the repercussion of increasing the
probability of bank runs.
We go on to show that not only is the early return less than 1, it is also less than
the rst best.
Proposition 7 The rst-best early return rFB is higher than the optimal early return
r.
Proof. We compare the rst order conditions for rFB and r
. The rst-order
condition for r given by equation (15) can be rearranged as follows:
u0 (r)  1 
   
Z 

u0

(1  r) 
1   +  (1  )

d (19)
=
(1  )
h
u

(1 )+(1 r (1 ))
1 

  
r
u (r)
i
d
dr
  R 



ru0(r) u(r)
r2

d

 
    :
u

(1 )+(1 r (1 ))
1 

> 
r
u (r). i.e. utility when no patient agent withdraws is
more than the utility when everyone withdraws. We know that d

dr
> 0:We also know
that 

ru0(r) u(r)
r2

< 0. This means that the RHS is positive.
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Therefore the LHS is also positive:
u0 (r)  1 
   
Z 

u0

(1  r) 
1   +  (1  )

d > 0: (20)
However the rst order condition for rFB given by equation (9) says that,
u0 (rFB) 
1
   
Z 

u0

(1  rFB) 
1  

d = 0:
In the rst-best, no unnecessary reserves are kept and therefore more can be in-
vested long term. This means,Z 

u0

(1  r) 
1      (   1)

d >
Z 

u0

(1  rFB) 
1  

d: (21)
. Therefore it must be that u0 (r) > u0 (rFB) which leads to the conclusion that
r < rFB.
Proposition 7 above gives a similar result as shown in the Goldstein and Pauzner
model. The optimal early return r turn out to be less than what was computed
under the rst-best scenario. This is because in the rst-best, the bank can observe
whether the withdrawer is truly hit by the liquidity shock. Therefore it keeps reserves
only to serve the impatient depositors and does not have to use the early return r
as an instrument to dissuade patient agents from withdrawing early. When the bank
cannot distinguish between the two types, it needs to cater to a higher proportion of
withdrawers, and therefore does not want to give them too much early return. With
higher r, the agents benet because of higher risk sharing. However, this increases the
reserves that are needed and reduces the long-term earning potential and increases the
probability of bank runs because it provides incentive for early withdrawal.
Scenario II - Non Transparent Reserve Policy
5 The Model
The previous scenario concluded that there is no need for regulation on the level of
reserves that a bank should keep because the banks in a competitive environment
would choose reserves and early returns to maximise expected utility of the agents.
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The results were driven by the fact that the reserves kept by the bank was public
knowledge.
The model is similar to the one in the original one except that now the level of
reserves,  (= r + (1  )), the bank puts aside cannot be observed, which gives rise
to moral hazard. Hence, the bank will choose reserves to maximise its prot. Those
who wait till the last period receive a proportion of the prot.
Like before, proportion ! of the agents would receive signals that are low enough
that they withdraw early, in addition to the  proportion who would denitely with-
draw.
In period t2, proportion  of the prots is distributed equally among the agents
who did not withdraw early. This is di¤erent to what happened in the basic model
where all the remaining returns were distributed to the agents and the objective was
to maximise the expected utility of the agents. Since the reserves cannot be observed
in this model, the objective function of the bank is to choose reserves,  to maximise
its expected prot, E:
For any ; the prot  for the bank is given as follows:
 =   r   (1  )!r + (1  )    (1  ) (1  !)
(1  ) (1  !): (22)
Rearranging equation (22),
 =
(1  )  + (1  ) (   !r)
(1 + )
: (23)
To facilitate the unique equilibrium, we assume that  has upper and lower dom-
inant regions. If only the agents who are hit by the liquidity shock withdraw, an
agent is better o¤ by withdrawing early if r   (1 )+(1 )
(1+)
: For this to be true, the
fundamental should be lower than 
s


s
= (1+)r (1 )
(1 )

. The lower dominant region
is [; 
s
) where everyone will withdraw and therefore if player is signal is i < 
s
  e
he will denitely withdraw because he knows that  < 
s
.
Like before we assume that when  is very high, the bank can get a loan at a
very high interest rate  to meet early demand: If everyone else withdraws the bank
will need a loan of (r   ). The bank will be able to get this loan if (1  )  
(r   ) (1 + )  0. When  is su¢ ciently high so that the bank can secure this loan,
if the agent withdraws early, he will receive r. If he does not withdraw he will receive
 (1 )  (r )(1+)
(1+)
. As long as  (1 )  (r )(1+)
(1+)
 r the agent is better o¤ by not
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withdrawing even if everyone else withdraws. This gives e = r(1+)+(r )(1+)
(1 ) . If the
signal that a patient player i receives is i > e + e he will denitely not withdraw
because he knows that  > e. The upper dominant region is [
s
; ) where no patient
agent will withdraw.
6 Threshold 
As in the basic model, we consider threshold strategies and set out the conditions for
 to be a symmetric equilibrium. If a patient player observes i > 
 he will not
withdraw and he will will withdraw if i < 
.
Note that even though reserves, , is not observable, the agents will predict it
in equilibrium, and choose  accordingly. If the reserves is su¢ cient to meet early
demand, withdrawers in t1 receive r and the bank makes  prot. Those agents who
wait till t2 receive . However, if the reserves is not su¢ cient to meet early demand,
the bank crashes, making zero prot and those agents who wait get nothing. Those
who withdraw early receive r with probability 
r+(1 )e!r : The returns that agent i
(who is patient) would get can be summarised as follows:
r + (1  ) e!r   r + (1  ) e!r > 
Withdraw early r r with probability 
r+(1 )e!r
Not withdraw early ( r (r+(1 ))( 1))
(1+)(1 )(1 e!(y)) 0
The di¤erence in the expected utility of agent i who received signal i between
withdrawing and not withdrawing in t1 is given by:
g
b (; ) = Z b+e  2er
i e
1
2e
 r + (1  )
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy +
+
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy + (24)
 
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u


((1  )   (1  )  e! (y) r + (1  ) y)
(1  ) (1  e! (y)) (1 + )

dy:
Proposition 8 There exists a unique point i =  such that g () = 0 where player
i is indi¤erent between withdrawing and not.
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Proof. Using equation (24), the expected utility from withdrawing is,
g1 =
Z b+e  2e
r
i e
1
2e
 r + (1  )
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy +
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy; (25)
and the expected utility from not withdrawing is,
g2 =
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u


(1  )   (1  )  e! (y) r + (1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e! (y)) (1 + )

dy: (26)
We need to show that there is only one point i = 
 where g1 = g2:
First we look at the behaviour of g2, which is the function that gives the expected
utility of not withdrawing. g2 = 0 for i  b   2er . When i  b   2er ; dg2di > 0; d2g2d2i
< 0 and therefore it is an increasing concave function:
Then we look at the function that gives the expected utility of withdrawing early.
g1 (:) is xed at
r+(1 )
r+(1 )ru (r) when i  b  2er . Then when b  2er  i  b+2e  2er ,
it is an increasing concave function: dg1
di
> 0; d
2g1
d2i
< 0: However, it is xed at u (r)
when i  b + 2e  2er :
Therefore we can conclude that g1 = g2 only at one point and hence, there exists
a unique point i = 
 such that g () = 0 where player i is indi¤erent between
withdrawing and not.
Lemma 1 below which is about  is useful to prove the subsequent propositions.
We nd how  changes with  and r. This is useful because even though  cannot
be observed, in equilibrium, it can be predicted what the reserves would be.
Firstly, the lemma shows the obvious, that the probability of bank run increases
with early return r. As early return increases, the agents have more incentive to
withdraw in t1.
Next it looks at what happens to the probability of bank runs at the point  = 0:
As explained earlier,  2 [r; r]. Therefore   0. What the lemma says is that
the probability of a bank run goes down with  when  = 0: Therefore to minimises
the probability of bank runs the bank needs to keep reserves over and above what
is needed to cater to those who are hit by the liquidity shock. As discussed in the
previous scenario, the existence of reserves will make the agents more condent that
the bank will not crash.
If there is more reserves to face the early demand, the agents are condent that
the bank will not crash in t1. When  = 0, the reserves are su¢ cient only to settle
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Figure 1: Threshold :
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the demand of those who would be hit by the liquidity shock and denitely withdraw.
This would make the agents very alert because even if one patient agent decides to
withdraw, the bank would crash. Therefore the probability of a bank run is very high.
Therefore as reserves get lower, getting closer to r, the threshold  goes towards the
upper dominant region.
Lemma 1 (1) d

dr
> 0; (2) d

d

=0
< 0 ; (3) Lim
!0
 ! e.
Proof. (1)
g ( (; r; )) =
Z +e  2e
r
 e
1
2e
 r + (1  )
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy +
+
Z +e
+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy + (27)
 
Z +e
+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u

 (y   r   (r +  (1  )) (y   1))
(1 + ) (1  ) (1  e! (y))

dy:
dg
d
=
1
2e
0BBBBBBB@
 u

(+e r (r+(1 ))(+e 1))
(1+)(1 )

+
+u

(+e  2er  r (r+(1 ))(+e  2er  1))
(1+)(1 )(1 r )

  R +e  2er e  (r+(1 ))(1 )r2e(r+(1 )e!(y)r)2u (r) dy
  R +e
+e  2e
r
u0 (:) ((y r (r+(1 ))(y 1)))(1+)(1 )
2e((1+)(1 )(1 e!(y)))2 dy
1CCCCCCCA
: (28)
The rst term in equation (28) is bigger than the second because it gives the utility
at a higher value of . Therefore on the whole dg
d < 0:
The rst two terms in the function g increase with r whereas the last term goes
down. Therefore on the whole, dg
dr
> 0:
Therefore d

dr
> 0.
Q.E.D.
(2) Next we look at how  changes with  when  is close to zero.
dg
d
=
1
2e
Z +e  2e
r
 e
(1  )
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy (29)
 1
r
u
 

 
 + e  2e
r
  r   (r +  (1  ))   + e  2e
r
  1
(1 + ) (1  )  1  
r
 !
+
1
2e
Z +e
+e  2e
r
u0 (:) (1  ) (y   1)
(1 + ) (1  ) (1  e! (y))dy:
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dg
d

=0
=
1
2e
Z +e
 e
(1  )
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy (30)
 1
r
u

 ( + e  r   r ( + e  1))
(1 + ) (1  )

+
1
2e
Z +e
+e
u0 (:) (1  ) (y   1)
(1 + ) (1  ) (1  e! (y))dy:
We have already shown in the rst chapter that the rst term in the above equation
(30) is negative. The last term is now negligible. Therefore dg
d

=0
< 0, which means
d
d

=0
< 0.
Q.E.D.
(3) To prove this, we use the indi¤erence condition given by g(:):
Recall equation (24).
g
b (; ) = Z b+e  2er
i e
1
2e
 r + (1  )
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy +
+
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy +
 
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u


((1  )   (1  )  e! (y) r + (1  ) y)
(1  ) (1  e! (y)) (1 + )

dy:
When  ! 0, the last term and the second term are over a small range whereas
the rst term is over a larger range.
Therefore for g () = 0 to hold ,  should be large, close to e.
7 Optimal Level of Reserves
First we look at the bench mark, where the agents can observe the reserves. This is
then compared with what the bank would choose when reserves cannot be observed
by the agents.
7.1 Benchmark when Reserves can be Observed
If the level of reserves can be observed, the agents can work out their expected utility.
Therefore, because the banks are in competition, the bank has to choose reserves to
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maximise the expected utility of the agents. When level of reserves is transparent,
reserves would then be, t = r + (1  )t.
Because noise is very small, ex ante the probability of a partial run is negligible.
If  <  all the agents withdraw and receive r with probability . When  >  the
agents have  probability of being hit by a liquidity shock and receive r while there is
(1  ) probability that they receive 
1  .
EU =
1
   
 Z 

u (r) d +
Z 


u (r) + (1  )u


1  

d
!
: (31)
Rearranging equation (31),
EU =
1
   
 Z 

u (r) d +
Z 


u (r) + (1  )u

 (   r    (   1))
(1  ) (1 + )

d
!
:
(32)
Proposition 9 When the level of reserves can be observed, the bank will choose t >
r:
Proof. We use equation (31) which gives the expected utility of an agent.
dEU
d
=
1
   
0BB@
R 

(1  )u (r) d + d
d
u (r)
 d
d

u (r) + (1  )u

( r ( 1))
(1 )(1+)

  R 


u0 (:) ( 1)(1 )
(1+)

d
1CCA : (33)
dEU
d

=0
=
1
   
0BB@
 (1  )u (r) + d
d
ru (r)
 d
d

u (r) + (1  )u

(1 r)
(1 )(1+)

  R 


u0 (:) ( 1)(1 )
(1+)

d
1CCA : (34)
We know that d

d
< 0. Further, ru (r) <

u (r) + (1  )u

(1 r)
(1 )(1+)

and
j=0 ! e.
So we can conclude that dEU
d

=0
> 0, and therefore to maximise the expected
utility of the agents, t > 0:
This means t > r:
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When reserves can be observed, we are in the same situation as in scenario 1 where
the expected utility of the agents has to be maximised. The nding is the same as
before that the level of reserves should be over and above what is needed for those hit
by the liquidity shock to maximise depositor welfare.
7.2 When Reserves cannot be Observed
Now we come to the main part of this analysis. When level of reserves cannot be
observed, the agents cannot estimate their long term returns. Therefore when the
reserves cannot be observed, the bank chooses level of reserves, , to maximise its
prot. Further, a proportion of the nal prot is distributed to those who wait till t2.
The banks objective is to maximise its expected prot, E.
If  <  there will be a bank run and therefore the bank gets zero prot.
However if  > ; only proportion  agents withdraw and therefore it makes
  r + (1  )    (1 )
(1 )

.
 = 0 if  < ;
=
(1  ) + (1  ) 
1 + 
if  > :
Therefore the ex ante expected prot E for the bank is given by,
E =
Z 

1
   

(1  ) + (1  ) 
1 + 

d: (35)
Proposition 10 When the level of reserves cannot be observed, the bank will choose
optimal reserves,  = r, which is lower than when reserves could be observed.
Proof. The proof is very simple. Rearranging equation (34),
E =
Z 

1
   

   r    (1  ) (   1)
1 + 

d: (36)
Because  cannot be observed by the agents,  will not be a¤ected by .
dE
d
=  
Z 

(1  ) (   1) 
    (1 + )d < 0:
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Therefore the bank will choose  = 0 to maximise prot - i.e.  = r.
According to proposition 9, when reserves could be observed, the bank would put
aside t > r:
Therefore,  < t which means when reserves cannot be observed, the bank keeps
less reserves.
When the agents cannot observe the reserves that the bank keeps, it cannot increase
the condence of agents through reserves. Therefore it will keep reserves as low as
possible. It will have to keep reserves to meet the demand of those hit by the liquidity
shock who would denitely withdraw, otherwise the bank will collapse leaving the
bank with no prots at all. Therefore, the bank will keep as reserves, just su¢ cient to
meet that demand - i.e.  = r.
Consider the implications of this lower level of reserves on the probability of bank
runs.
Proposition 11 When reserves cannot be observed, the probability of bank runs is
higher.
Proof. The agents will choose  knowing that  = 0:
According to lemma 1 j=0 will be close to the upper dominant region and
d
d
< 0.
Therefore j=0 > jt>0 which means the probability of bank runs is higher
when reserves cannot be observed.
Not only is the probability of bank runs higher, but obviously the expected utility
of the agents is lower because the banks objective is to maximise the expected utility.
This nding has policy implications. If the level of reserves cannot be observed,
or if the agents are not informed to understand what is revealed, the regulators have
a role to play. They can set reserve requirements that takes into consideration the
welfare of the agents and make the agents aware that they are thus regulating. In
countries where agents are able to comprehend such information, the regulators can
make it a statutory requirement to make the level of reserves transparent.
8 Early Return
In this section we look at what happens if early return, r is a choice variable. The
bank is set in a competitive environment and since early return is observable, r has
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to be chosen to maximise expected utility of depositors. When reserves cannot be
observed, the bank would choose early return, r, given  = 0. Is it any di¤erent from
the early return that would be chosen if reserves was transparent, rt?
Proposition 12 Early return when reserves cannot be observed, is higher than the
early return when reserves is transparent. i.e. r > rt.
Proof. Let the bank choose early return r and rt when reserves are not trans-
parent and transparent respectively. In both the cases, the early return is observable
and the bank is in competition. Therefore it will choose early return to maximise the
expected utility of the agents, EU .
Recall equation (32), giving EU ,
EU =
1
   
 Z 

u (r) d +
Z 


u (r) + (1  )u

 (   r    (   1))
(1  ) (1 + )

d
!
:
dEU
dr
=
1
   
0BBBBB@
d
dr
(r + (1  ))u (r)
+
R 

(u (r) + (r + (1  ))u0 (r)) d
+d

dr

u (r)  (1  )u

( r (r+(1 ))( 1))
(1 )(1+)

+
R 


u0 (r) 


(1+)

u0

( r (r+(1 ))( 1))
(1 )(1+)

d
1CCCCCA : (37)
When reserves cannot be observed, the bank will choose  = 0.
dEU
dr

=0
=
1
   
0BB@
R 

(u (r) + ru0 (r)) d+
  (1  ) d
dr
u

(1 r)
(1 )(1+)

+
R 


u0 (r) 


(1+)

u0

(1 r)
(1 )(1+)

d
1CCA : (38)
According to lemma 1, ==0 ! e. Therefore the last term in equation (16) is
negligible. The rst term is signicant. The second term is the late return at one
point,  whereas the rst term is over the whole range (; ) : When  is large, d

dr
will be small (threshold  cannot increase more than e which makes d
dr
negligible).
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Further, we prove below that r > 1.
dEU
dr

=0;r=1
=
1
   
0BB@
R 

2d+
  (1  ) d
dr
u


(1+)

+
R 


1 


(1+)

d
1CCA : (39)
 > u (),  > u


(1+)

, 2 > (1  )u


(1+)

, 2 > (1  ) d
dr
u


(1+)

:
If we x = 0;R 

2d + 
R 


1 


(1+)

d > (1  ) d
dr
u


(1+)

:
Therefore dEU
dr

=0;r=1
> 0 which means r > 1.
Now we look at the bench mark model where reserves can be observed and  and
r are chosen to maximise the EU: When reserves can be observed, the bank would
choose t > 0:
dEU
dr

r=1
=
1
   
0BB@
d
dr
(1  )

 u

(  (+(1 ))( 1))
(1 )(1+)

+ 

+( (1  ) +  (1 + )) (   )
  R 


+ u0 (:)


(1+)

d
1CCA : (40)
The rst and last terms are negative. Only the second term is positive, which is
negligible compared to the others.
Therefore dEU
dr

>0;r=1
< 0 so that we can conclude that rt < 1:
This means that if the level of reserves was transparent, the bank will choose an
early return that is less than one, which is lower than what it would choose when
reserves cannot be observed.
The bank, which operates in a competitive environment chooses an early return,
which is observable, that is high in order to attract customers. It is also noteworthy
that according to lemma 1, because d

dr
> 0, when reserves cannot be observed, the
banks would choose an early return that increases the probability of bank runs, com-
pared to when the level of reserves was transparent. As in the case of optimal reserves,
this also gives a lower expected utility.
Therefore when level of reseres cannot be observed, the regulators have another
role to play, which is to control the early return r that the banks o¤er.
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9 Conclusion
We have a model of bank runs using a global game framework in an attempt to nd
out how much reserves a bank should keep and what is the early return it should o¤er
to maximise the expected utility of the depositors. The analysis was done under two
scenarios, namely, when the level of reserves could be observed by the depositors, and
when it could not be.
Under the rst situation, it is found that both the optimal reserves and early returns
should be increasing with the proportion of impatient agents and decreasing with the
earning capacity of the bank. It is also found that compared to the rst-best case, the
optimal early return is lower. Another interesting result is that in addition to those
who are hit by the liquidity shock, others also might withdraw early, and therefore
reserves was found to be more than what was needed to cater to the impatient agents.
This ine¢ ciency increases with the proportion of impatient agents. We also nd that
maximum expected utility to depositors requires a positive probability of bank runs.
Policy makers should take note that if banks are operating in a competitive en-
vironment where the agents can observe reserves, the bank would voluntarily choose
reserves to maximise the expected utility of depositors. Therefore there is no need
for reserve requirements, however it should be ensured that reserves are made known
and there is a competitive environment. Giving insurance to early withdrawers is not
healthy.
The second scenario looked at whether there would be a need for regulation if the
level of reserves was not transparent. The answer was found to be in the a¢ rmative.
It was found that when the level of reserves cannot be observed, the bank chooses
a level of reserves that is too low and chooses early return that is too high. This
not only lowers the welfare of the depositors but also creates nancial instability by
increasing the probability of bank runs. Therefore when the level of reserves cannot be
observed, the regulators do have a role to play in xing minimum reserve requirement
and maximum early return that the banks could choose.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Recall equation 1 which gives the di¤erence in the expected utility of agent i who
received signal i between withdrawing and not withdrawing.
g (i (r; ; )) =
Z b+e  2e
r
i e
1
2e
 
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy
+
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy + (41)
 
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u

  r   (1  )  e! (y)  r + (1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e! (y))

dy:
g : R! R .
Because of the lower dominant region, Lim
i!
g (i) > 0 so that if an agent receives a
signal , he will withdraw. On the other hand, because of the upper dominant region,
Lim
i!
g (i) < 0 so that an agent who receives a signal  will not withdraw. This is
because the expected return from not withdrawing is very high.
Therefore, as long as the function is continuous a value exists for i such that
g

;b = 0. Because of symmetry, all agents are indi¤erent between withdrawing
early and not doing so when they receive a signal .
The expected utility of withdrawing early is continuous. When i  b 2e, e! (y) =
1 8 y. This means we have a constant expected utility,  + (1  ) 
r

u (r). When
i  b + 2e, e! (y) = 0 8 y giving a constant expected utility of u(r). In between the
expected utility continuously increases.
The expected utility of not withdrawing early is zero for i  b   2er . After that,
it increases continuously. Therefore the function g(:) is continuous in i.
Now we show that the point where g

;b = 0 is unique.
Please refer to gures at the end.
For the range i  b   2e, e! (y) = 1 8 y. The expected utility of not running is
zero. This means we have a constant g(:)j(ib 2e) = r+(1 )ru (r) > 0:
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For the range b   2e  i  b   2er , e! is high enough that you receive nothing by
waiting.
g(:)j(b 2eib  2er ) =
Z b e
i e
1
2e
 
r + (1  ) ru (r) dy +
+
Z i+e
b e
1
2e
 
r + (1  ) e! (y) ru (r) dy: (42)
It is clear that g(:)j(b 2eib  2er ) > 0:
Furthermore in this range, as i increases, the expected proportion of those wanting
to withdraw goes down. i.e. the expected utility of running continuously increases with
i.
dg(:)
di
=(b 2eib  2er ) =
1
2e
0@ 
r + (1  )
b i+2e
2e

r
  
r + (1  ) r
1Au (r) : (43)
We know that
b i+2e
2e
< 1:Therefore dg(:)
di

(b 2eib  2er ) > 0.
For the range, b + 2e   2e
r
 i  b + 2e, e! (y)  r .8 y. Therefore the bank
is expected not to crash 8 y. Those who withdraw early will receive r for sure. By
waiting the agent is expected utility is
R i+e
i e
1
2e

u

 + (1 )y
(1 )(1 e!(y))

dy:
g(:)j(b+2e  2er ib+2e) = u (r) 
Z i+e
i e
1
2e

u

 +
(1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e! (y))

dy: (44)
In this range bank will not crash. i.e. r is low enough to make the reserves su¢ cient
to cater to early demand. If early withdrawal is better than not withdrawing, everyone
will denitely withdraw prompting the bank to crash. The fact that the bank does
not crash in the range tells us that when b + 2e   2e
r
 i  b + 2e, we have
u (r)  R i+e
i e
1
2e

u

(1 )( !)+(1 )y
(1 )(1 !(y))

dy.
Therefore g(:)=(b+2e  2er ib+2e) < 0:
Also note that in this range, when i increases, the expected utility of running does
not change, but remains at u (r). However the expected utility of waiting increases
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with i.
dg(:)
di
=(b+2e  2er ib+2e) =  
1
2e
0BBBB@
u
 
 + (1 )(i+e)
(1 )

1 b i
2e

!
 u
 
 + (1 )(i e)
(1 )

1 b i+2e
2e

!
1CCCCA : (45)
It is obvious that the utility when y = i + e is greater than the utility when
y = i   e:
Therefore dg(:)
di

(b+2e  2er ib+2e) < 0:
For the range, i  b + 2e, e! (y) = 0 8 y. This means,
g(:)j(ib+2e) = u (r) 
Z i+e
i e
1
2e

u

 +
(1  ) y
1  

dy: (46)
R i+e
i e
1
2e
u

 + (1 )y
1 

dy > u (r) when i  b + 2e. Therefore g(:)=i>b+2e < 0:
Furthermore
dg(:)
di

ib+2e =  u( +
(1  ) (i + e)
1   ) + u( +
(1  ) (i   e)
1   ): (47)
dg(:)
di

ib+2e < 0 because u( +
(1 )(i+e)
1  ) > u( +
(1 )(i e)
1  ):
We can now conclude that, if there is a point at which g(:) = 0, it will be in the
range b   2e
r
 i  b + 2e  2er :
We have to check there is only one such point.
This is so if in this range the function g(:) is concave. In this range the function
g(:) can be split into two parts: b   2e
r
 i  b and b  i  b + 2e  2er .
In the range b   2e
r
 i  b, where
g(:)j(b  2er ib) =
Z b e
i e
1
2e


+ (1  ) 
r

u (r) dy +
+
Z b  2e
r
b e
1
2e
 
  r + (1  )  e! (y)  ru (r) dy
+
Z i+e
b  2e
r
1
2e
u (r) dy (48)
 
Z i+e
b  2e
r
1
2e
 u

 +
(1  ) (   !) + (1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e!)

dy:
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dg
di
b  2e
r
ib =
1
2e
0BB@
u (r) (1  )  1  
r

 u
 
 +
(1 )

 b i
2e
r

+(1 )(i+e)
(1 )

1 b i
2e

! 1CCA : (49)
d2g
d2i
=b  2e
r
ib =   12eu0 (:)
(1  )   r 
2e

+ (1  )
(1  )

1 b i
2e
2 < 0: (50)
Therefore in the range b   2e
r
 i  b, g(:) is concave.
In the range b  i  b + 2e  2er , where
g(:)j(bib+2e  2er ) =
Z b+e  2e
r
i e
1
2e
 
r + (1  ) e!ru (r) dy
+
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u (r) dy (51)
 
Z i+e
b+e  2e
r
1
2e
 u

 +
(1  ) (   e!) + (1  ) y
(1  ) (1  e!)

dy:
dg
di

(bib+2e  2er )
=
1
2e
0@ (1  )
b i
2e
r + r   

r + (1  )
b i
2e
+ 1

r
1Au (r)
  1
2e
u
0@ + (1  )

   b i
2e
r
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In this range, as i increases, the expected returns from running increases with i
which is given by the rst term.. This is because now the range over which you surely
receive r increases and the probability of receiving r increases. Let this term be A. This
increases at a decreasing rate: The second term refers to the expected returns from
not running which increases with i. Let this be B. This increase is at an increasing
rate.
d2g
d2i

(bib+2e  2er )
=
dA
di
  dB
di
< 0:
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Figure 2: EU of running and not running with i
Therefore we can conclude that there exists a unique  such that above which,
g < 0 and below which, g > 0 and thereby a patient agent would not withdraw if
i > 
 and would withdraw if i < 
.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 3: Threshold :
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